Inadequate supervision, or lack of supervision, is the most common allegation of negligence involving children in schools and other organizations. It is estimated that 80% of plaintiffs’ allegations involve supervision.
That being said, inadequate supervision, or lack of supervision, may not necessarily create liability – it must be shown that the lack of supervision is actually the proximate cause of the injury. Further, for the plaintiff to recover there must first have been a duty to supervise the plaintiff on the part of the defendant. A key element is the distinction between a duty to render “specific” supervision and a duty to provide “general” supervision. Other issues deal with the competence of the person who is supervising, the location of the supervisor at the time of the injury and the number of supervisors on duty.
What constitutes due care and adequate supervision depends largely on the circumstances. These can include the number and age of the children, the activity in which they are engaged, the period for which they may have been left without supervision, the ease of providing some alternative means of supervision and the capacity of the child.
The duty to supervise children in schools and other organizations, such as the YMCA summer camp, after-school park programs and other activities, may arise in the same manner as any duty owed – by statutory requirement, by voluntary assumption of a duty and by the duty being inherent in the situation. The basis of duty is whether or not there is a special relationship between the child and the organization which requires that organization to take affirmative action and provide a reasonable safe environment. However, inasmuch as one is not an insurer of safety and all situations do not give rise to a duty, there are a considerable number of cases wherein the allegation is failure to supervise – but in fact there is no duty to supervise. The duty to supervise should be distinguished from the authority to control the conduct of participants under the doctrine of in loco parentis.
An example of a school not having a duty to supervise is depicted in the following example: An 8-year-old was struck by a 12-year-old on a bicycle while riding on the school playground. The accident happened on a Saturday. The court held that where the activity drawing the spectators was not a school-related activity, there was no requirement for supervision by the school. Further, the school did not have knowledge that bicycles had been ridden in that area in a negligent or dangerous manner prior to the accident. (Orsini v. Guilderland Central School Dist. No. 2, 46 A.D. 2d 700, 360 N.Y.S. 2d 288 (1974); see also Diel v. Board of Education, 1 A.D. 2d 676, 146 N.Y.S. 2d 511 (1955) child struck by playmate on bicycle when about ready to leave playground – no duty; Kantor v. Board of Educ., 251 A.D. 454, 296 N.Y.S. 516 (1937) no duty, boy playing tag on bicycle injured child.))
Another example is where there may be no duty to supervise because of the nature of the activity and the expectations and/or capacity of the children. In a 1986 Tennessee case a 13-year-old eighth grade boy was injured, while on a school field trip, when struck by an automobile when he crossed the street after lunch to go to the park. Plaintiff alleged that the two teachers were negligent in not personally escorting the student across the street. The court held that teachers do not have such duty where there was nothing to suggest that the student would not use ordinary care for his own safety or that the street was unreasonably dangerous to cross. (King v. Kartanson, 720 S.W. 2d 65 (Tenn. App. 1986))
If an injury is not foreseeable, there is no duty to supervise. In a D.C. case involving a child who wandered off public school playground, through a gap in the fence, and was struck and killed in the street by a truck, the court said that if no special dangerous condition exists, a school is not under a duty to supervise all movements of its students at all times, but where such a condition does exist, and the school has knowledge of its existence, greater supervision is required to insure the safety of the students. (Ballard v. Polly, 387 F. Supp. 895 (1975); see also Abdur-Rashad v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 135 A.D. 2d 208, 524 N.Y.S. 2d 716 (1988) child injured on tracks near playground, no duty to child who left playground absent any defect or condition of playground making danger foreseeable.))
In conclusion, there first needs to be an activity which requires supervision if lack of supervision is going to be alleged.
